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NOTE
Cabining Judicial Discretion over Forensic Evidence
with a New Special Relevance Rule
Emma F.E. Shoucair*
Modern forensic evidence suffers from a number of flaws, including insufficient scientific grounding, exaggerated testimony, lack of uniform best practices, and an inefficacious standard for admission that regularly allows judges
to admit scientifically unsound evidence. This Note discusses these problems,
lays out the current landscape of forensic science reform, and suggests the addition of a new special relevance rule to the Federal Rules of Evidence (and
similar rules in state evidence codes). This proposed rule would cabin judicial
discretion to admit non-DNA forensic evidence by barring prosecutorial introduction of such evidence in criminal trials absent a competing defense expert
or a high showing of scientific viability.
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Introduction
On January 20, 1980, Santae A. Tribble was convicted of armed robbery
and the felony murder of a taxi driver he had never met. 1 He spent the next
twenty-eight years in prison, where he contracted HIV and hepatitis. 2
Mr. Tribble’s conviction was based on testimony 3 from the FBI Crime Laboratory that there was a high degree of similarity between his hair and hair found
at the scene. 4 But, in 2012, mitochondrial DNA testing revealed that Mr. Tribble could not have contributed any of the hairs found at the scene. 5 One of the
hairs the FBI had matched to Mr. Tribble had come, in fact, from a dog. 6 In
February 2016, a judge ordered the District of Columbia to pay Mr. Tribble
over $13 million in damages.7
In 2015, the Justice Department and the FBI admitted that 26 of the 28
examiners in the FBI Crime Laboratory had given exaggerated testimony from
1972 to 1999; 8 these examiners had overstated to juries the actual probative
value of hair-match analysis. 9 Of the 268 trials with overstated hair-match evidence examined by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
and the Innocence Project, 14 of the defendants “sentenced to death . . . [had]
been executed or died in prison.” 10 During those trials, there would have been
no reason for the judges, prosecution counsel, or defense counsel to suspect
they were being presented with exaggerated testimony. And the problem is

1. See Santae Tribble, Nat’l Registry of Exonerations (July 3, 2012) (updated July
19, 2016), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3926
[https://perma.cc/WH83-98C8].
2. Spencer S. Hsu, Judge Orders D.C. to Pay $13.2 Million in Wrongful FBI Hair Conviction Case, Wash. Post (Feb. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/
judge-orders-dc-to-pay-132-million-in-wrongful-fbi-hair-conviction-case/2016/02/28/
da82e178-dcde-11e5-81ae-7491b9b9e7df_story.html [https://perma.cc/3CME-EAAZ].
3. The D.C. Superior Court order granting Tribble’s certificate of innocence notes that
the expert’s testimony was “critical to the jury’s decision.” Certificate of Actual Innocence at 1,
United States v. Tribble, No. 78 FEL 4160 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2012).
4. Hsu, supra note 2.
5. Santae Tribble, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Tribble v. District of Columbia, 144 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 669, 680 (D.C. Super. Ct.
2016), amended by 2016 WL 3405166, at *1 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 2016).
8. Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Admits Flaws in Hair Analysis over Decades, Wash. Post (Apr.
18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/fbi-overstated-forensic-hair-matchesin-nearly-all-criminal-trials-for-decades/2015/04/18/39c8d8c6-e515-11e4-b510-962fcfabc310_
story.html [https://perma.cc/N7SR-BGPF].
9. Id.
10. Id.
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broader than hair analysis: since 1989, 524 exonerations nationwide involved
false or misleading forensic evidence. 11
Forensic science is defined as “the application of scientific principles and
techniques to matters of criminal justice especially as relating to the collection,
examination, and analysis of physical evidence.” 12 The public’s relationship
with forensic science is complicated, and forensic evidence has become paramount in criminal trials. Many jurors have come to expect forensic evidence
in criminal trials, 13 even though most trials involve none. 14 Some research suggests that this so-called “CSI Effect” makes jurors less willing to convict in the
absence of forensic evidence. 15 As a result, investigators will sometimes perform unnecessary tests in the field simply to have something “scientific” to
present to a jury. 16 These tendencies underscore the importance of ensuring
only accurate and reliable forensic evidence reaches a jury: as the Supreme
Court noted in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., “[e]xpert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in
evaluating it.” 17
Part I of this Note describes the current federal evidentiary framework for
admitting expert scientific testimony. Part II discusses the problems with forensic science in criminal trials: the lack of foundational scientific validity, the
lack of any rigorous system of laboratory accreditation or certification system

11. % Exonerations by Contributing Factor, Nat’l Registry Exonerations, https://
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx
[https://perma.cc/HY3N-ULJT].
12. Forensic Science, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/
forensic%20science [https://perma.cc/E4HN-BX4T].
13. Donald E. Shelton, The ‘CSI Effect’: Does It Really Exist?, Nat’l Inst. Just. (Mar. 17,
2008),
https://www.nij.gov/journals/259/pages/csi-effect.aspx
[https://perma.cc/G9DKMMVC] (indicating that 46% of jurors expect to see scientific evidence in every criminal case,
22% expect to see DNA evidence in every criminal case, 36% expect to see fingerprint evidence
in every criminal case, and 32% expect to see ballistic evidence in every criminal case).
14. For an estimate of cases in which forensic evidence exists, see, for example, Keith
O’Brien, The Case Against Evidence, Bos. Globe (Nov. 7, 2010), http://archive.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2010/11/07/the_case_against_evidence/ (on file with the Michigan Law
Review) (detailing a survey of homicide cases in which only 13.5% featured physical evidence,
with DNA evidence in only 4.5% of the cases).
15. Shelton, supra note 13.
16. Arun Rath, Is the ‘CSI Effect’ Influencing Courtrooms?, NPR (Feb. 5, 2011, 7:30 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2011/02/06/133497696/is-the-csi-effect-influencing-courtrooms (on file
with the Michigan Law Review).
17. 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence Is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991)). The President’s
Council of Advisors in Science and Technology’s (PCAST) 2016 report emphasizes the uniquely
dangerous nature of forensic testimony—jurors largely lack the knowledge and ability to evaluate expert forensic testimony independently and are likely to attach high probative value to a
“match” (which for many forensic tests are subjective). President’s Council of Advisors on
Sci. & Tech., Exec. Office of the President, Report to the President: Forensic Science
in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods 45
(2016) [hereinafter PCAST Report].
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for individual practitioners, the institutional barriers to improving the system,
and the problematic ways in which judges and juries interact with forensic
evidence. Part III proposes a new special relevance rule excluding non-DNA
forensic evidence in criminal trials under certain circumstances absent a significant showing of scientific validity. This new rule would protect the integrity of the legal process in the face of inaccurate evidence. Finally, Part IV addresses potential counterarguments to the adoption of this new special
relevance rule.
I.

Forensic Evidence in Federal Courts

The admissibility of forensic evidence, presented through expert testimony, is governed by two rules in federal court: Federal Rules of Evidence 702
and 403. 18 These rules often have analogues in state evidence codes 19 and are
motivated in part by concerns about the high degree of deference juries often
give to expert testimony. 20 To prevent juries from over-valuing expert opinions, care must be taken to ensure the testimony juries hear is based on reliable
and valid methodologies.
Rule 702 governs when expert testimony may be admitted:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the
facts of the case. 21

This version of Rule 702 is the legislative adoption of Daubert’s expert testimony admission standards. 22 Daubert makes judges the “gatekeepers” of the
courtroom: away from the jury, a judge determines whether the expert

18. Fed. R. Evid. 702; Fed. R. Evid. 403.
19. For example, Pa. R. Evid. 702, which varies slightly from its federal counterpart in
requiring that the “expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge [be] beyond that
possessed by the average layperson,” and Pa. R. Evid. 403, which, in contrast to Fed. R. Evid.
403, discussed infra, only requires that the probative value be outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice (eliminating “substantially”).
20. See Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence Is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991)).
21. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
22. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588; see Gary Edmond et al., Admissibility Compared: The Reception of Incriminating Expert Evidence (i.e., Forensic Science) in Four Adversarial Jurisdictions,
3 U. Denv. Crim. L. Rev. 31, 39 (2013) (noting that the revision to Rule 702 in 2000 was made
“to make the need for ‘reliability’ explicit” in light of the opinion in Daubert).
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testimony can be admitted. In making this determination, the judge must assess whether the information the expert will convey is relevant and helpful to
the factfinder, as well as whether that testimony is the product of a valid set of
methods. 23 Daubert presents a nonexhaustive list of factors for judges to consider when conducting this validity inquiry: testing, peer review, error rates,
existence/maintenance of standards, and general acceptance. 24 This set of factors replaces the old inquiry into “general acceptance” by the scientific community from Frye v. United States. 25 These factors are instructive as to whether
proffered expert scientific or technical testimony is “junk” or not. The Supreme Court expanded on Daubert in two subsequent cases, General Electric
Co. v. Joiner 26 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael. 27 Joiner established the
standard of review for Daubert hearings as abuse of discretion, 28 and Kumho
extended the scope of Daubert to include nonscientific knowledge, including
“technical” or “other specialized knowledge.” 29
The ruling in Daubert was not unanimous. In his dissent, Chief Justice
Rehnquist expressed discomfort with the amount of authority given to judges
to exclude evidence on the basis of their own nonexpert scientific fluency: “I
do not doubt that Rule 702 confides to the judge some gatekeeping responsibility in deciding questions of the admissibility of proffered expert testimony.
But I do not think it imposes on them either the obligation or the authority to
become amateur scientists in order to perform that role.” 30 It appears, however, that how the rule is formulated does not make a huge difference in what
evidence gets admitted in certain contexts. States have adopted Daubert to
varying degrees. Some states have adopted it formally, while others maintain
the older Frye standard; 31 still others have created a hybrid standard. 32 In the

23. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93.
24. Id. at 593–94.
25. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
26. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
27. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
28. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 141.
29. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147–48.
30. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 600–01 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
31. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (establishing the criteria for
admission as general acceptance within the applicable scientific community, a standard much
more deferential to the relevant scientific communities and entailing less active judicial examination of the evidence itself).
32. Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific and
Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453, § 2 (2011) (noting that 25 states have
formally adopted Daubert as the standard for admissibility, while fifteen states plus the District
of Columbia still use Frye; six states combine Daubert factors into Frye, and four states have
unique tests).
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end, junk science appears to reach juries with similar frequencies in state
courts regardless of the formal rule. 33
In addition to the different developmental paths seen between federal and
state courts in the application of Daubert, there is also a marked divergence
between civil and criminal contexts. In criminal trials, which are rife with forensic evidence and are the focus of the present inquiry, defense attorneys regularly fail to bring Daubert challenges. 34 When they do bring these challenges,
they usually lose. 35 It is sometimes said that a rigorous cross-examination—
the very heart of the adversarial process—will expose any junk forensic evidence. 36 In practice, however, this has not been borne out. In instances where
fraud or misconduct on the part of testifying experts was later uncovered, not
once did cross-examination bring the conduct to light. 37 If the adversarial system of nonscientists is not in practice discovering fraud in criminal contexts,
it is unlikely to discover a lack of underlying peer review, a lack of general
scientific acceptance, or a lack of falsifiability. If the point of Daubert was to
ensure the accuracy of admitted expert testimony, it has not succeeded. 38
More generally, Rule 403 lays out the general standard for when any evidence can be excluded: “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue
delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” 39

33. See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study
of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 Va. L. Rev. 471, 482–90 (2005) (discussing the evolution
of state court judges’ attitudes toward questionable scientific evidence in toxic tort contexts, suggesting the metric of the frequency with which tort defendants in state court remove to federal
court as a way of showing the differing treatment of scientific evidence on the federal and state
levels). In state level civil litigation, “the choice between a Frye and Daubert standard does not
make any practical difference.” Id. at 475.
34. See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards
of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 99, 104 (2000) (describing a survey of federal
appellate cases and district cases, as well as state cases that showed the rapid increase in expert
challenges in civil cases after Daubert as compared to a much smaller increase in criminal cases).
35. Id. at 105–08 (showing that in criminal cases on appeal in a federal court, “defenseproffered expertise was found to be properly excluded 83% of the time . . . and government proffered expertise was found only once to be so undependable as to require exclusion”); id. at 109–
10 (showing that the statistics are similar at the federal district court level).
36. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595–96 (1993)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
37. Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some Suggestions for Reform, 95 Am. J. Pub. Health, S107, S109 (2005).
38. Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science: Daubert’s Failure, 69 Case W. Res. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 3–6) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). On the other hand,
in federal civil cases, the results of Daubert have been “decidedly pro-defendant” and have “empowered defendants to exclude certain types of scientific evidence, substantially improving their
chances of obtaining summary judgment and thereby avoiding what are perceived to be unpredictable and often plaintiff-friendly juries.” Cheng & Yoon, supra note 33, at 473.
39. Fed. R. Evid. 403.
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Analyzing evidence under Rule 403 entails balancing the probative value of
the evidence against the risk of unfair prejudice to the party opposing its admission (generally, in criminal trials, the defendant). Early attempts to exclude
questionable forensic evidence, such as polygraph examinations, went
through Rule 403. 40 Highly prejudicial expert testimony can still be excluded
through 403 balancing even if it survives Rule 702. Indeed, in several instances, Congress has determined some types of evidence fail 403 balancing as
a matter of law (that is, “its probative value is substantially outweighed by a
danger of . . . unfair prejudice”) 41 and are per se excluded for certain purposes. 42 It is against the backdrop of Rules 702 and 403 that this Note examines
the substantive problems with expert forensic evidence.
II.

Problems with Forensic Evidence

A. Unreliable Tests and Unreliable Testimony
Many of the common forensic tests used to convict criminal defendants
are not backed up by scientific data, which ought to raise concerns about admissibility under 702. The lack of foundational scientific data for many forensic techniques has garnered considerable attention, both in popular media and
in legal scholarship. 43 DNA matching, “a fortuitous by-product of cuttingedge science,” 44 is the gold standard for forensic evidence. 45 Notably, and in
contrast to many of the other commonly used forensic tests, DNA testing was
not developed for the purpose of use in court. It was subjected to rigorous
peer-reviewed analysis in the scientific community to determine its validity,
and only then was it applied to criminal proceedings (and even then only after

40. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 95 F.3d 723, 730 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that the
district court had not abused its discretion in excluding polygraph evidence on the grounds that
it was more prejudicial than probative under Rule 403); United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208,
1216–17 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that polygraph testing could be properly excluded under Rule
403 as overly prejudicial even if admissible under Rule 702).
41. Fed. R. Evid. 403.
42. See infra Section III.C.
43. For an up-to-date survey of the legal literature and comments by courts expressing
dissatisfaction with the scientific validity of commonly used forensic tests, see Giannelli, supra
note 38; see also LastWeekTonight, Forensic Science: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO),
YouTube (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ScmJvmzDcG0 [https://perma.cc/
R553-YL33].
44. Comm. on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Scis. Cmty., Nat’l Research
Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward 133
(2009) [hereinafter NAS Report].
45. “[E]minent scientists contributed their expertise to ensuring that DNA evidence offered in a courtroom would be valid and reliable.” Id.
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a fierce debate). 46 As a result, its probative value is very high, although (mostly
human) errors still happen.47
In these ways, DNA is an outlier. Other common forensics tests were developed specifically for use in criminal investigation, 48 and their validity and
accuracy have not been confirmed through peer-reviewed studies. For example, the FBI recently recognized the need for foundational studies establishing
the validity and error rates for latent fingerprint analysis, a technique that has
been in use since 1800 without any serious verification of its accuracy. 49 The
FBI’s study, just one of two studies to date that have attempted to assess error
rates, suggests that errors may appear in one out of every 306 cases, 50 a rate
that is very much out of line with our cultural intuitions about fingerprint accuracy. Without being explicitly informed of this reality, juries will continue
to operate as though fingerprint matching is infallible. A summary of common forensic tests can be found below:

46. For an overview of the use of DNA evidence in court (starting in 1986 after its discovery and initial scientific vetting in 1953), see Lisa Calandro et al., Evolution of DNA Evidence for
Crime Solving—A Judicial and Legislative History, Forensic Mag. (Jan. 6, 2005, 3:00 AM),
https://www.forensicmag.com/article/2005/01/evolution-dna-evidence-crime-solving-judicialand-legislative-history [https://perma.cc/C5Q4-TFJM]. For a discussion of the so-called “DNA
wars,” see, for example, Gina Kolata, Two Chief Rivals in the Battle Over DNA Evidence Now
Agree on Its Use, N.Y. Times (Oct. 27, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/27/us/two-chiefrivals-in-the-battle-over-dna-evidence-now-agree-on-its-use.html (on file with the Michigan
Law Review).
47. Kolata, supra note 46.
48. Often, the tests themselves are developed by laboratories affiliated with prosecutorial
offices, raising the issue of partiality. See, for example, the controversial EDTA test developed
on short notice by the FBI Crime Laboratory for use in Stephen Avery’s trial in Netflix’s popular
Making a Murderer. Amelia McDonnell-Parry, Experts Offer Concerns Over Forensic Testing in
‘Making a Murderer’ Case, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/experts-offer-concerns-over-forensic-testing-in-making-a-murderer-case-20160414
[https://perma.cc/28U7-HLXV].
49. PCAST Report, supra note 17, at 101.
50. Id.
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51

X 52 X 53 X 54 X 55 X 56 X 57

51. Unless otherwise noted, this information has been taken from the NAS Report, supra
note 44, at 127–83.
52. Objective tests are tests in which a definitive match between two samples is possible—
for example, DNA collected from a crime scene and DNA collected from a suspect. Subjective
tests, on the other hand, are tests in which a human tester makes a judgment call as to the similarity of two samples—for example, the visual characteristics of a hair found at a crime scene and
a hair collected from a suspect.
53. Note that it is difficult to calculate error rates without a discussion of what type of
error is being discussed; errors can include subjective examiner error, instrumentation error vs.
actual statistical error inherent in the method of testing itself. This distinction is generally beyond the scope of the current discussion.
54. PCAST Report, supra note 17, at 72.
55. Id. at 101.
56. Id. at 111.
57. Id. at 84
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As the table above demonstrates, most forensic tests are not objective or
particularly scientific, creating a mismatch between jury expectations and reality. This mismatch, especially when considered in conjunction with the discussion of accreditation below, demonstrates the difficulties inherent in using
scientifically dubious subjective methods to convict defendants. The entire
perceived value of forensic evidence is its objectivity and rigor: it is presented
as science. The 2016 report by the President’s Council of Advisors on Science
and Technology (PCAST) recommends abandoning bitemark analysis and
hair match analysis (which it called “scientifically unacceptable” 58) because
the probability they will be developed into scientifically valid methods is very
low. It also found shoeprint impression identification analysis to be lacking in
scientific foundational validity. 59 Yet despite the obvious and now well-publicized flaws with these types of evidence, they are routinely admitted as evidence in criminal trials. 60
In addition to problems with the tests themselves, there are also issues
with forensic experts’ trial testimony. Even the analysts at the FBI Crime Laboratory are not immune from problematic testimony, as detailed by the
Washington Post in 2015. 61 A 2009 study found that in a sample of 156 exonerees convicted using the testimony of forensic experts and later exonerated
using DNA evidence, 60% of the cases included invalid forensic testimony—
implicating 72 analysts and 52 laboratories. 62 The most common errors in the
invalid forensic science testimony were incorrect use of population data (e.g.,
“only 5% of the population has red hair” when no data on the frequency of
hair types exists) 63 and overstatement of the probative value of forensic tests 64
(e.g., the FBI’s use of hair match despite a lack of empirical evidence showing

58. PCAST Report, supra note 17, at 121, 148.
59. See id. at 61–62, 117.
60. Stephanie L. Damon-Moore, Note, Trial Judges and the Forensic Science Problem,
Note, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1532, 1536 (2017) (discussing possible reasons for judges continuing to
admit forensic evidence).
61. See Hsu, supra note 8.
62. Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1, 1–2 (2009).
63. Id. at 9. The authors further subdivide this type of error into the following types:
nonprobative evidence presented as probative, exculpatory evidence discounted, and inaccurate
frequency or statistic presented. To illustrate this type of error, the authors point to a rape case
in which the prosecution’s expert testified that the genetic material from a vaginal swab of the
victim contained a genetic marker for blood type B (the defendant’s blood type), and stated that
only 11% of Caucasians have type B blood, making it very likely that the defendant was the rapist.
The expert failed to disclose, however, that the victim also had type B blood, and that the marker
detected could have come exclusively from the victim and masked markers from the semen. Id.
at 17–18.
64. Id. at 9. The authors further subdivide this type of error into the following types: statistic provided without empirical support, non-numerical statements provided without empirical support, and conclusion that evidence originated from defendant. Id. at 18–19.
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its validity). The study also found systemic issues with the legal treatment of
invalid forensic testimony:
Unfortunately, our criminal system may not be well situated to prevent unscientific testimony. The adversarial system largely failed to police the invalid testimony during these trials. Defense counsel rarely cross-examined analysts concerning invalid testimony and rarely retained experts, since courts
routinely deny funding for defense experts. Prosecutors, moreover, presented erroneous accounts of the forensic evidence during closing arguments. In a few cases in which the defense challenged invalid forensic science, judges seldom provided relief. Courts do not typically review testimony
after finding the underlying methodology reliable and permitting the forensic analyst to take the stand. 65

Garrett and Neufeld’s observation highlights the need for both scientific
and legal reform. The forensic science community should strive for the most
reliable and accurate data it can provide, and the legal system needs to do a
better job policing the admission of inaccurate information.
B. Accreditation, Certification, and Best Practices
A separate set of problems with forensic science relates to the laboratories
and analysts that carry out the testing. Forensic science laboratories are overwhelmingly administered by law enforcement agencies, raising concerns
about the potential for conflict between laboratory priorities of achieving the
most accurate results and law enforcement priorities of achieving the greatest
number of convictions. 66 The National Academic Press (NAS) report names
the independence of forensic laboratories as a priority for ensuring the scientific integrity of forensic testimony. 67
Lack of accreditation for forensic laboratories in most states is also a cause
for concern. The NAS report notes:
Several commentators appearing before the committee noted that nearly anyone with a garage and some capital theoretically could open a forensics laboratory and start offering services. Although this might be a bit hyperbolic,
the fact is that there are no requirements, except in a few states (New York,
Oklahoma, and Texas), for forensics laboratories to meet specific standards
for quality assurance or for practitioners to be certified according to an
agreed set of standards. 68

In addition to a lack of a uniform accreditation system (or even the existence
of mandatory state-level accreditation in every state), there is likewise no uniform set of quality control or quality assurance standards. 69 There is no system

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 10–11.
NAS Report, supra note 44, at 183–84.
Id.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 193–94.
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of federal oversight. 70 The result is, unsurprisingly, uneven quality of laboratories. 71
The problems do not end with the laboratories. Blind proficiency testing
of individual examiners is recommended but often not required. 72 There is no
uniform system of individual certification; rather, different subdisciplines
have their own certification processes, and “some certification organizations
appear to lack stringent requirements.”73 The lack of a universal, rigorous
standard for individual certifications raises special concerns, given that so
much of forensic testimony is based on subjective testing in which the analyst
makes visual matches. 74 Confidence in the analysts providing the expert testimony is essential, and there is currently no reliable system in place to warrant
such confidence.
C. Barriers to Improvement
The 2009 NAS and the 2016 PCAST reports provide recommendations
for improving the state of forensic science. The NAS report recommends reforms like the congressional establishment of an independent federal oversight body to promulgate standards and fund peer-reviewed research into reliability and error rates. 75 It also recommends the establishment of accredited
and independent laboratories, as well as the creation of standards for forensic
analysts. 76 The PCAST report recommends continuing scientific studies to
shore up foundational validity and to convert subjective tests into objective
ones. 77 The authors of the report urge the judiciary to use scientific standards
when weighing admission,78 implying they think judges are not currently doing so. 79
These recommendations shed light on the difficulties in achieving standardized reform. 80 Congress has not created or funded an independent agency
to address substandard forensic science, and it is unlikely to make it a priority
in the near future. Certain legislative incentives cut against expecting action
from Congress or state legislatures. Increasing the rigor of forensic science

70. Id. Thus necessitating the NAS recommendation that Congress create an agency. See
infra note 75 and accompanying text.
71. NAS Report, supra note 44, at 194.
72. Id. at 207–08.
73. Id. at 209–10.
74. See supra Table 1.
75. NAS Report, supra note 44, at 19.
76. Id. at 190–91, 214–15.
77. PCAST Report, supra note 17, at 128–29.
78. Id. at 142–45.
79. Id.
80. See generally Jessica D. Gabel, Realizing Reliability in Forensic Science from the Ground
Up, 104 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 283 (2014).
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could be considered defendant friendly, and elected representatives are often
reluctant to seem “soft on crime.” 81 These issues also exist on the state legislative level. 82 There was pushback from law enforcement agencies to the 2016
PCAST report before the report had even been released,83 so there is reason to
believe that law enforcement groups oppose some of the proposed reforms.
This is not to say that no progress has been made. At the end of his administration, President Obama detailed the advances made in criminal justice
reform, including the establishment of the National Commission on Forensic
Science, which recommended that the Department of Justice (DOJ) be required to use accredited labs whenever practicable, and increased research
into the foundational validity of many of the common forensic tests discussed
above. 84 But the Obama administration faced criticism for not requiring federal law enforcement agencies to adopt the recommendations of the 2016
PCAST report. 85 While recognition that tests like hair match are not scientifically valid is a step in the right direction, no legislative or executive action was
taken under President Obama to prevent the use of such tests.
However lackluster advocates found the Obama administration’s push toward reform, movement has trended in the opposite direction under President Trump. Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s decision in April of 2016 to allow the National Commission on Forensic Science to expire has “rais[ed]
concerns among defense attorneys and other advocates about the future of the
Justice Department’s work in that arena.”86 Deputy Attorney General Rod
Rosenstein announced a new working group “whose top missions will be setting uniform standards for how experts testify about such evidence and creating a program to monitor the accuracy of forensic testimony” as well as improving the resources of crime labs. 87 The move, however, has been met with
criticism because the working group will be internal to the DOJ and not independent, and therefore tied to prosecutorial interests. 88 Additionally,
81. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev.
505, 509, 529–33 (2001).
82. Id.
83. Del Quentin Wilber, White House Panel Expected to Issue Report Critical of Some Forensic Evidence in Criminal Cases, L.A. Times (Sept. 1, 2016, 4:05 PM), http://www.latimes.com/
nation/la-na-council-forensic-evidence-20160831-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/LMY9WLS6] (“Jim Pasco, executive director of the National Fraternal Order of Police, was briefed on
the recommendations and said it appeared to be based on a ‘half-baked model’ that ‘calls into
question technologies’ that have long been used in court.”).
84. Barack Obama, Commentary, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 811, 860–61 (2017).
85. Radley Balko, Obama’s Rhetoric on Forensics Is at Odds with His Record, Wash. Post
(Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/01/05/obamas-rhetoric-on-forensics-is-at-odds-with-his-record/ [https://perma.cc/7GWR-Q743].
86. Sadie Gurman, Justice Department Considers Revamp of Federal Standards for Forensic Evidence, PBS (Aug. 7, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/justice-department-revives-effort-looking-forensic-evidence [https://perma.cc/39FS-LH4C].
87. Id.
88. Id.
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Rosenstein has said that “[w]e must use forensic analysis carefully, but we
must continue to use it . . . . We should not exclude reliable forensic analysis,” 89 seemingly without acknowledgment that the analysis is, in many cases,
simply not reliable.
The scientific state of affairs outlined here is alarming. The practical difficulty of achieving meaningful outright reform through Congress, as well as
the slow or nonexistent movement by the executive branch, underscores the
need for changes in how the legal system regulates the admission of forensic
evidence.
D. Judges, Juries, and Daubert
We now turn to examining a “puzzling and consequential question”:
“[w]hy didn’t the Supreme Court’s ‘junk science’ decision, Daubert[], prevent
or restrict the admissibility of testimony based on flawed forensic techniques?” 90
Daubert instructed judges to engage with the science as science (through,
for example, an evaluation of peer review) on an individualized basis, not just
to inquire as to whether a community of practitioners accepted it. 91 The fact
that little difference can be detected in evidence admission in states that have
shifted from the Frye standard to the Daubert standard 92 perhaps indicates
that judges are not actually applying the scrutiny now required by Rule 702.
Some scholars have suggested that judges resist the admissibility standards presented in Daubert, even in the civil context. Federal judges will sometimes cite to cases that pre-date Daubert or admit evidence that does not meet
the criteria of Rule 702 and say the jury is to evaluate the “weight” of the testimony. 93 There is also some evidence that judges do not want to play the role
of gatekeeper of scientific evidence. One judge even noted that “the process of
dealing with expert scientific testimony” was like “being ‘hit . . . between your
eyes with a four-by-four.’ ” 94 Few judges have scientific backgrounds; it is

89. Id.
90. Giannelli, supra note 38 (footnote omitted).
91. Compare Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993) (noting
that “the trial judge must determine . . . whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid”), with Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)
(articulating the test as whether “the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs”).
92. See Chen & Yoon, supra note 33, at 498–99.
93. David E. Bernstein, The Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert Revolution, 89
Notre Dame L. Rev. 27, 54–55 (2013); see Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., 639 F.3d 11
(1st Cir. 2011).
94. Cassandra H. Welch, Note, Flexible Standards, Deferential Review: Daubert’s Legacy
of Confusion, 29 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1085, 1096 (2006) (quoting Jon Y. Ikegami, Objection:
Hearsay—Why Hearsay-Like Thinking Is a Flawed Proxy for Scientific Validity in the Daubert
“Gatekeeper” Standard, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 705, 711 (2000)).
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likely difficult for them to be the gatekeepers for information they do not have
the tools to understand. The situation may be even more complicated: some
evidence suggests that judges overall apply greater rigor to expert testimony
offered by criminal defendants and civil litigants than they do to that offered
by prosecutors. 95 In other words, it’s not that judges cannot adequately evaluate the science, it’s that in certain contexts they have incentives not to.
Other explanations for a judicial willingness to admit evidence that
should be excluded under Rule 702 and Daubert in criminal trials include the
fact that many judges are former prosecutors, that judges in many states must
run “ ’tough on crime’ elections,” 96 that defense attorneys fail to object to prosecution expert witnesses, and that judges generally have concerns about withholding evidence from juries. 97
Lack of judicial rigor in applying the Daubert standard is especially concerning in criminal trials where prosecutors introduce questionable forensic
evidence; the introduction of forensic evidence itself may be prejudicial, since
juries are possibly predisposed to accepting it regardless of its actual scientific
validity. In recent years, the media has often discussed the so-called “CSI Effect,” which purports to make prosecutors’ jobs harder because the public has
now come to expect forensic evidence and will not convict without it. 98 But
there is also some data suggestive of a somewhat different effect: the public
has come to view forensic science as generally accurate. 99 This uncritical acceptance is a troubling development, and it is all the more important that unsound scientific evidence be excluded before it reaches a jury. Doing so requires reexamination of the admission standard in criminal trials.
III. Toward a Solution: A New Special Relevance Rule
There are a number of productive avenues for fixing the complex set of
problems presented by junk forensic science, many of them involving scientists, law enforcement officers, lawyers, and legislators. These potential solutions are outlined above in the discussion of the NAS and PCAST reports. 100
The actual scientific research necessary to develop these methods into rigorous tests with probative value must be conducted by scientists, federal standards must be put into place to ensure consistency across jurisdictions, and the

95. Damon-Moore, supra note 60, at 1535, 1535 n.15; see also Neufeld, supra note 37, at
S109.
96. Damon-Moore, supra note 60, at 1536.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Brian Dakss, ‘The CSI Effect’, CBS (Mar. 21, 2005, 10:47 AM), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/the-csi-effect/ [https://perma.cc/7MXS-5CDL] (noting that jurors in
the Robert Blake murder trial refused to convict based on eyewitness testimony, and quoting a
juror as saying “[i]f [the prosecutor] would have had [blood spatter or gunshot residue evidence],
that would have meant that he was guilty”).
99. Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the ‘CSI Effect’ Effect: Media and
Litigation Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 1335, 1354–55 (2009).
100. See supra Section II.C.
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development and execution of forensic tests must take place free from prosecutorial influence. These solutions, however, will all require time and funding,
and scientifically questionable evidence should not continue to be admitted in
the meantime.
Other strategies for allaying the risks of misleading evidence involve encouraging defense attorneys to bring Daubert (and state-level equivalent)
challenges to any prosecution expert presenting forensic evidence. States can
be encouraged to enact or improve wrongful conviction recovery statutes.
Eighteen states have no such statutes, 101 and increasing the recovery amounts
in the states that do have them will disincentivize the use of unscientific evidence. Given the political constraints on passing legislation perceived as defendant friendly, 102 and because public defenders in many jurisdictions carry
huge caseloads, 103 increasing expectations placed on the defense would not be
productive. Because of the difficulties inherent in implementing these solutions, the most efficient way to minimize the damage junk science can do to
the legal system is to exclude it, at least until there exists adequate scientific
data demonstrating validity and reliability for each individual method.
A. Evidence Code Generally
Our evidence codes tend to be liberal—they trust juries and overall favor
jury evaluation of evidence. Rule 402 lays out the baseline for admission: “Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise:
the United States Constitution; a federal statute; these rules; or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.” 104 There are situations, however, in which relevant evidence is deemed too prejudicial to reach a jury. 105 Because non-DNA
forensic evidence’s prejudicial effect on a jury substantially outweighs its probative value, this Note proposes adding a narrow special relevance rule excluding non-DNA forensic evidence in criminal trials under certain circumstances. This is not to say that non-DNA forensic evidence has zero probative

101. Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, Innocence Project, http://www.innocence
project.org/compensating-wrongly-convicted/ [https://perma.cc/R2L9-PGWC].
102. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 81, at 509–10 (2001) (describing the criminal justice system as “a one-way ratchet that makes an ever-larger slice of the population felons” due to both
public pressure and cooperation between legislators and prosecutors).
103. “On average, a public defender would need about 3,035 work hours—a year and a
half—to do a year’s worth of work.” Jaeah Lee et al., Charts: Why You’re in Deep Trouble if You
Can’t Afford a Lawyer, Mother Jones (May 6, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2013/05/public-defenders-gideon-supreme-court-charts
[https://perma.cc/6KJ7CPV5]. See generally Carrie Dvorak Brennan, Note, The Public Defender System: A Comparative
Assessment, 25 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 237 (2015).
104. Fed. R. Evid. 402.
105. For example, Rule 403 excludes evidence when the risk of unfair prejudice to the opposing party substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. As discussed infra, several federal evidence rules categorically exclude highly prejudicial evidence with low probative
value for certain purposes as a matter of law.
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value; for example, a fiber match may be able to tell you broad characteristics
about that fiber, even if it cannot provide more specific information. But the
prejudicial effect on criminal juries 106 is simply too high a price to pay to warrant admission of this type of evidence absent better scientific grounding.
B. Rule 416: A New Special Relevance Rule
In light of the above discussion, this Note proposes a new rule barring
prosecutors from introducing non-DNA forensic evidence absent either a
competing defense expert or a high showing of scientific validity. This rule
will ensure either that the jury has adequate context for the evidence or that
the burden is placed on the proponent to prove that the evidence is scientifically valid. 107 This Section argues that, as a matter of law, the risk of unfair
prejudice from current non-DNA forensic evidence substantially outweighs
its probative value, and that the interests of justice are not being served by
allowing for judicial discretion regarding this type of evidence.
Balancing under Rule 403 already requires assessing the probative value
of the evidence in question and then asking whether this probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the opposing
party. 108 As discussed above, the probative value of non-DNA forensic evidence is low. 109 Error rates are often not known, and when they are, they can
be higher than we expect or should be comfortable with. 110 Unlike DNA
matching, these methods often cannot match a defendant to a crime scene.
Rather, they often can only narrow the list of possible matches. In some cases,
they cannot even do this.111
On the other hand, the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant created
by non-DNA forensic evidence is extremely high. We have been attuned to
the dangers of juries blindly believing experts since before the adoption of the
revised Rule 702—ensuring the reliability of expert testimony that reaches juries is a key motivation for the rule itself. 112 Add to this the credulous relationship between juries and forensics, and even forensic testimony with
106. See infra Section III.B.
107. While nominally the burden of proof for expert testimony does lie with the proponent
under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993), in practice the
evidence is admitted absent an affirmative challenge from the opponent. See supra Section II.D.
The proposed rule would require a threshold showing of validity from the proponent without
requiring the opponent to object.
108. Fed. R. Evid. 403.
109. See supra Section II.A.
110. Recall that the error rate for fingerprint matching is potentially one in several hundred. See supra Section II.A.
111. In bitemark comparison analysis, for example, forensic odontologists often cannot
agree on whether a mark is a bite at all. See supra Table 1.
112. “Ever since experts have been testifying, courts and commentators have worried that
judges and jurors, themselves lacking the relevant expertise, will be unable to distinguish genuine
expertise from the external trappings of it.” Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Is Expert
Evidence Really Different?, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 13 (2013).
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appropriate jury instructions can have prejudicial effects. 113 Often this testimony comes in even without those caveats. 114 Because forensic evidence is so
prejudicial, the probative value would have to be extremely high for it to pass
403 balancing. Indeed, this is why DNA matches pass muster under 403: the
odds of a mistake are low, and the probative value of a DNA match is extremely high. 115 We do not see that kind of probative value with non-DNA
forensic evidence, and so, as a matter of law, the probative value we do see is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
To cabin judicial discretion to admit this type of evidence, this Note proposes the following special relevance rule:
Rule 416: Non-DNA Forensic Evidence in Criminal Trials
(a) Definitions:
(1) “Non-DNA forensic evidence” shall include the results of a
comparative test meant to identify a suspect, to identify material
relevant in a criminal proceeding, or to match material relevant in
a criminal proceeding to a suspect, aside from results that pertain
to the use of genetic material to identify a suspect.
(2) These tests include, but are not limited to: hair-match analysis,
bitemark comparisons, ballistics matching, fingerprint matching,
arson analysis, firearm identification, and toolmark identification.
(b) The prosecution shall not be permitted to introduce non-DNA forensic matching in criminal proceedings unless the method has gained
acceptance in the relevant academic science community comparable to
that enjoyed by DNA evidence for the purposes for which it is being
admitted.
(c) Exception: The prosecution can introduce non-DNA forensic evidence if the defense presents a competing expert speaking to the evidence to be introduced.

In the absence of a competing defense expert to provide context to the
jury, this rule bars the admission of hair match, bitemark, fiber analysis, and
other similar test results until and unless proponents of this type of evidence
can get credentialed scientists to conduct rigorous peer-reviewed studies
demonstrating validity to a high degree of certainty. For many forensic tests—
for example, bitemark analysis—reaching this level of support is unlikely. 116

113. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
114. See, for example, the systemic exaggerated testimony around hair match analysis discussed in notes 8–10 supra.
115. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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For others, such as fingerprints, additional testing could firm up the understanding of error rates. 117 The goal here is to admit only evidence that reaches
DNA-levels of reliability: liberty should not be restricted on the basis of less.
This rule is limited to criminal proceedings, since as discussed above, the adversarial process and judicial gatekeeping seem to function better in civil contexts, 118 making outright exclusion unwarranted there. The list of examples
provided in 416(a)(2) is not exhaustive and should be extended by analogy to
exclude new forensic tests that have not yet reached the requisite level of evidentiary support.
This proposed rule explicitly requires that the general acceptance component of the inquiry be carried out with respect to academic science communities, not to groups of forensic science practitioners. The explicit reference to
academic scientists in the rule permits challenges to forensic evidence only if
the thinking in those communities changes and once-accepted methods become discredited.
The inquiry into whether a forensic test has reached the threshold for admission will resemble the inquiry mandated by Daubert that has proved difficult to conduct. The difference is that the new rule requires an explicit comparison to the amount of testing, level of peer review, understanding of error
rates, presence of standard maintenance, and level of general acceptance for
DNA matching evidence, and so it gives judges an objective benchmark
against which to evaluate the evidence in question. To guard against any judicial tendency to claim reliability where there is none, appellate courts should
review the admissions de novo. Requiring a default, intentionally high, threshold showing from the proponent, intense scrutiny on appeal, and the existence
of an actual objective benchmark should ensure greater rigor in the admission
of problematic forensic testimony for the purposes of conviction. The defense
is given considerably more latitude in evidence it can introduce to a jury, parallel to Rules 404(a)(2)(A)–(C) discussed below, because less reliable evidence
may still introduce reasonable doubt.
C. Parallels in Existing Evidence Rules
All parts of this proposed rule have precedent in existing parts of the federal evidence code, and this rule is an extension of principles and concerns
already at play in other parts of the code. While removing judicial discretion
seems counter to the principles of a liberal evidence code, Congress has on
multiple occasions decided to do precisely this.
Several evidence rules create different standards for civil and criminal
contexts, with the understanding that criminal conviction carries with it serious penalties, including loss of life, restriction of liberty,

117.
118.

PCAST Report, supra note 17, at 10.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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disenfranchisement, 119 and difficulty in obtaining employment. 120 There is
thus a recognition that evidentiary rules are sometimes different in criminal
proceedings than in civil proceedings. For example, Rule 404(a)(2)(A)–(C) 121
allows criminal defendants wider latitude in introducing certain types of character evidence than the government, with the understanding that character
evidence may sow the seed of reasonable doubt. Similarly, Rule 803(8)(A)(ii)
permits the admission of public records that otherwise would be considered
hearsay, unless that record was made by a law enforcement officer under the
duty to report in a criminal case. To preserve the defendant’s rights, that report cannot be admitted without the officer present for cross-examination. 122
The federal evidence code is familiar with making different rules for civil and
criminal contexts, as the proposed Rule 416 would do.
Under Rule 410, evidence of pleas, plea discussions, and related statements are not admissible except under narrow circumstances. 123 The rationale
behind this exclusion is in part to protect criminal defendants from what
would be the admission of extremely prejudicial evidence against them (statements made during plea negotiations) even though the probative value of
these statements might be very high. The proposed new rule would bar similarly prejudicial evidence that has a far lower likely probative value than statements excluded under Rule 410; the goal of protecting criminal defendants is
the same.

119. See, e.g., Felony Disenfranchisement, Sent’g Project, http://www.sentencingproject.
org/issues/felony-disenfranchisement/ [https://perma.cc/JUY6-W9NY].
120. See Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Statistical Discrimination: A Field Experiment, 133 Q. J. Econ. 191 (2018).
121. Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(2)(A) (allowing a criminal defendant to offer evidence of the
defendant’s pertinent trait); Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(2)(B) (allowing a criminal defendant to offer
evidence of an alleged victim’s pertinent trait).
122. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(A)(ii).
123. FED. R. EVID. 410:
(a) Prohibited Uses. In a civil or criminal case, evidence of the following is not admissible
against the defendant who made the plea or participated in the plea discussions: (1) a
guilty plea that was later withdrawn; (2) a nolo contendere plea; (3) a statement made
during a proceeding on either of those pleas under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11 or a comparable state procedure; or (4) a statement made during plea discussions with
an attorney for the prosecuting authority if the discussions did not result in a guilty plea
or they resulted in a later-withdrawn guilty plea.
(b) Exceptions. The court may admit a statement described in Rule 410(a)(3) or (4):
(1) in any proceeding in which another statement made during the same plea or
plea discussions has been introduced, if in fairness the statements ought to be considered together; or (2) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement, if
the defendant made the statement under oath, on the record, and with counsel present.
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Likewise, there are several instances in the federal evidence code in which
evidence fails 403 balancing as a matter of law. Rules 407, 124 408, 125 409, 126 and
411 127 each categorically bar the admission of subsequent remedial measures,
compromise offers and negotiations, offers to pay medical expenses, and the
presence/absence of liability insurance, respectively, for the purposes of showing liability (although this type of evidence is admissible for other purposes).
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence chose to remove judicial discretion in these instances; even relevant evidence is per se inadmissible for the
purposes of showing liability. The prejudicial effect on juries is simply too high
when weighed against the minimal probative value this evidence provides for
the proscribed purposes. 128
IV. Addressing Counterarguments
A. Limiting Instructions or Categorical Exclusion?
It has been argued that the evidence code should be more liberal with respect to expert testimony, in that Daubert mandates the exclusion of expert

124.

FED. R. EVID. 407:

When measures are taken that would have made an earlier injury or harm less likely to
occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove: negligence; culpable conduct; a defect in a product or its design; or a need for a warning or instruction.
But the court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as impeachment or—if
disputed—proving ownership, control, or the feasibility of precautionary measures.

125.

FED. R. EVID. 408:

(a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible—on behalf of any
party—either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction: (1) furnishing, promising, or
offering—or accepting, promising to accept, or offering to accept—a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and (2) conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim—except when offered in a
criminal case and when the negotiations related to a claim by a public office in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority. (b) Exceptions. The court
may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice, negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal
investigation or prosecution.

126. FED. R. EVID. 409: “Evidence of furnishing, promising to pay, or offering to pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses resulting from an injury is not admissible to prove liability for
the injury.”
127. FED. R. EVID. 411: “Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is
not admissible to prove whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. But the
court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice
or proving agency, ownership, or control.”
128. For example, the presence of liability insurance often causes juries to worry about
double recovery regardless of the actual presence or absence of liability; on the other hand, the
probative value of whether or not a party had liability insurance for determining whether or not
the party was negligent is not particularly high, since many non-negligent parties carry liability
insurance. Fed. R. Evid. 411 advisory committee’s note to 1972 Proposed Rules.
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testimony that is more reliable than, say, eyewitness identification, which we
know to be seriously problematic and which comes in with no problems under
Rule 402. 129 There is nothing special, this line of argument goes, about expert
testimony justifying the higher standard for admission. The literature along
these lines questions the prevalence of jury overvaluation of expert testimony
as a reason for the heightened concern. 130 It points to evidence that juries may
view experts more as “hired guns” and argues that, generally, deference to experts is not irrational jury behavior. 131 Regardless of whether or not there is
empirical evidence showing that juries do not overvalue expert testimony generally, forensic evidence may be different: the expert testifying is not just any
expert but often one with additional indicia of government authority. And
given the state of some forensic evidence, assigning any value may be too
much value.
Professor Richard Friedman argues that Daubert should be “squeezed out
of the picture” and reliability replaced by other approaches to evidence admissibility. 132 He suggests that hair match analysis, although unreliable, still has
enough probative value to be admitted with an instruction from the judge as
to the proper weight 133 as a “less restrictive” alternative to outright exclusion. 134 Given the problems detailed above, however, forensic evidence can be
either “affirmatively misleading” 135 or “of so little probative value as not to be
worth the costs of presenting it” 136 and should thus be excluded. This argument for exclusion can be made completely independent of the overvaluation
concern that Friedman argues is overblown. 137 The admission of forensic evidence is often “wrong in a way that may be damaging to the search for
truth,” 138 and the evidence of this has only gotten stronger as we collect better
data on exonerations.
Friedman makes the good point that the ideal process would be for courts
of last resort to exclude misleading evidence as a matter of law,139 but since
this is simply not happening, it would be wise to explore other options to
129. Schauer & Spellman, supra note 112, at 8–10.
130. Id. at 13.
131. Id. at 13–16.
132. Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing Daubert Out of the Picture, 33 Seton Hall L. Rev.
1047, 1048 (2003). Friedman suggests that the bulk of evidence admissibility determinations be
about sufficiency rather than reliability, in part because such determinations are as a matter of
law and thus subject to de novo review, a condition I also argue for with my proposed rule. Id.
at 1065–69.
133. Id. at 1057–59.
134. Id. at 1048.
135. Richard D. Friedman, Minimizing the Jury Over-Valuation Concern, 4 Mich. St. L.
Rev. 967, 968 (2003).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 969–71.
138. Id. at 984.
139. Id.

October 2018]

New Special Relevance Rule

195

solving the problem, including the use of legislatures instead of courts. Friedman also identifies exclusion of evidence as a potentially beneficial driving
force for the improvement of such evidence, 140 but the current system is not
driving that improvement, either. Forcing the junk evidence to remain out
until enough improvement takes place to increase its probative value significantly will spur the development of better forensic tests. It is also worth noting
that the proposed Rule 416, when combined with existing judicial behavior in
civil contexts, would create Friedman’s preferred set of standards for expert
evidence: “[s]tandards should be very lenient for criminal defendants, and
tougher for prosecutors, with the standards for civil litigants somewhere in
between.” 141 This scale would be created by legislative rather than judicial action.
B. Making It More Difficult to Secure Convictions
A central objection to the proposed Rule 416 is that it will make it extremely difficult to admit non-DNA forensic evidence and therefore make obtaining convictions of guilty defendants more difficult. This rule will make
admitting junk science much more difficult in criminal trials. If the government is concerned that courts are excluding relevant evidence, Congress and
state legislatures are free to create financial incentives for academic science
communities to test current forensic methods and develop new, more accurate ones that can be admitted under the new rule. If evidence of reliability
cannot be obtained through rigorous study, that forensic test should never be
used to convict.
Another possible objection is that this rule will not be responsive enough
to cutting-edge scientific developments. The response to this objection is twofold. First, once a forensic testing method reaches the level of scientific
grounding and acceptance enjoyed by DNA matching, Congress can amend
the rule and create an exception explicitly allowing it without the formality of
the threshold showing of evidentiary support. In any case, the proposed rule
itself would make an allowance for forensic testing methods that have proved
their mettle. 142 Second, while it would perhaps be preferable from an efficiency
standpoint to have a judicially driven evolving standard for what is a reliable
forensic-testing method rather than relying on the political branches, the last
25 years have shown us that this is simply not a workable solution. Resource
constraints on public defenders’ offices are not likely to ease in the near future.
Forensic science laboratories are not likely to decouple from prosecutors’ offices. Federal oversight of the science and the accreditation is likewise not

140. Id.
141. Friedman, supra note 132, at 1047.
142. See supra Section III.B (Proposed Rule 416(b): “The prosecution shall not be permitted to introduce non-DNA forensic matching in criminal proceedings unless the method has
gained acceptance in the relevant academic science community comparable to that enjoyed by
DNA evidence for the purposes for which it is being admitted.”).
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likely to be forthcoming. 143 Reliance on the improvement of the evidence itself
is likely misplaced, and the price we pay in improper convictions in the meantime is too high.
Conclusion
Regardless of the reasons for judges’ failure to exclude scientifically unacceptable forensic evidence, giving the gatekeeping role to judges was probably
overly burdensome to begin with.
It’s not like trial judges got together for a big celebration when Daubert came
out,’ [U.S. District Court Judge Paul] Grimm said. ‘I am a judge because I
didn’t understand science and math! If I could do science and math, I’d be
Doctor so-and-so, not Judge so-and-so. That’s the reaction of judges in terms
of dealing with these things. 144

There is increasing recognition among judges that they need to be doing a
better job at excluding evidence they, too, once thought was “infallible.” 145 But
a more efficient solution and one better suited to achieving justice would be
to acknowledge the limitations of their training and cabin their discretion. Forensic evidence should not be admitted absent a showing that it enjoys as high
reliability and acceptance among scientists as DNA match evidence, which is
what the proposed Rule 416 would achieve. The destruction of lives, such as
Santae Tribble’s, due to the irresponsible use of scientifically invalid evidence
cannot continue in a system that values justice and accurate trial results.

143. See supra Section II.C.
144. Maria Dinzeo, Skepticism of Forensic Methods Urged at 9th Circuit Conference,
Courthouse News (Jul. 18, 2017), https://www.courthousenews.com/skepticism-forensicmethods-urged-9th-circuit-conference/ [https://perma.cc/V6NA-VQ2N].
145. Id.

